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Abstract  
To establish the two key in wireless sensor network is a basic security services, forming the basis other security 
services, such as authentication and encrypted. However, due to the sensor network resource constraints on to 
establish the two key not wireless sensor networks trivial tasks. The existing key, pre-alpha-ever scheme compromise 
node number and a minor part however influence key will increase quickly. As a result, a small compromise the 
number of node may affect the most adversaries. This paper proposes an improved key management wireless sensor 
network plan, take advantage of one-way hash function to alleviate the influence of compromise the sensor high 
sensor nodes. At the same time, this method does not affect the connection between neighboring sensor node. The 
analysis shows that compared with the existing plan which has good network resilience against node capture attack.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor network is composed of a large number the sensor nodes through converging wider 
area connections, and have different kinds of applications include environmental monitoring, industrial 
monitoring, safety, security services, military system, the medical service, etc. These mission critical 
applications in wireless sensor network make security and privacy of function requirement. However, in 
wireless sensor networks achieve security is a challenging because the task, particular constraint ability 
understanding sensor node (battery supply, CPU, memory, etc) and stern deployment of a sensor network. 
A safe and key performing encryption and authentication must reach agreement by transportation node. 
However, due to the resources constraint network of sensors in much key agreement mechanism used in 
general networks, and other public key to not feasible scheme Sensor network.  
There are three types of key management scheme in has been studied wireless sensor networks: trust, 
server solution, scheme and key pre-distribution, get enforcing scheme. Reliable server solution of 
dependence trust key distribution server and management [1, 2]. This type of scheme is not verbs for 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
2 B.V. Selection and/or peer-revie  under responsibility of G rry Lee
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
2184   Sun Qian /  Physics Procedia  25 ( 2012 )  2183 – 2189 
wireless sensor networks because usually lack of trust infrastructure application environment, wireless 
sensor networks use. Get enforcing scheme, on the other hand, with asymmetric encryption, for example, 
key distribution management use public-key certificate. However, limited company calculation and 
energy resources usually sensor nodes make it undesirable use public key algorithms, such as RSA.  To 
save energy the second type of the key management solutions, namely, the key pre-alpha-ever plan, such a 
plan pre-alpha-distributed key information scheme seems the most appropriate wireless sensor network; it 
is types of scheme we think here. 
 Two straight forward solutions can distribute symmetric-key to wireless sensor node. The first solution 
is to make all the sensor nodes storing a same master key [3]. Any two nodes can use this global master 
key realization agreement and acquired new double key. Although these look verbs are simple and 
effective system has good effectiveness, this scheme does not exhibition desirable network elasticity. If a 
node is damaged, safety of the whole wireless sensor, the network will be compromised. Some existing 
research shows. In temper - resistant storage master key hardware reduced Risk [4], but this increased 
costs and energy consumption. In addition, resistant hardware tamper don't always safe [5]. At the other 
extreme, some may consider giving each pair of sensor nodes region double key. This means that each 
sensor nodes need to store n-1 different double key in its memory if have n node to wireless networks 
sensor network. This solution has the perfection of network security because any sensor node of capture 
or compromise will not affect non-begin the communication between the nodes.  This plan is main 
limitation key is stored in his head, this makes it is not suitable for large wireless sensor network. 
 In recent years many pre-distribution applicable key scheme has proposed establishing double key. In 
literature [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [12] [11] [13], the existing key pre-distribution scheme, number of number 
compromise node, increased rates of influence double key increases rapidly. Therefore, a small part 
compromise node may lead to substantial double key damage. To solve these problems, this paper puts 
forward a method pair wise key management solutions to improve safety against ability sensor nodes are 
caught. The remainder of this proposition, unified organization as follows. In the second part, the related 
work of the sketch. A detailed description we proposed the key way realization was established Part 3. 
The fourth chapter gives performance analysis comparison, and conclusion in the fifth part of this paper 
2. Related work 
The first key puts forward pre-alpha-ever Eschenauer and Gligor in [5], and was assigned sensor nodes 
random subset from a big key in key pool deployment of the network. Deployment after two adjacent, 
however, can build sensor nodes between them the key as long as they had at least one common feature in 
their key rings. Unfortunately, such key pools are very susceptible to in collusion. A few attacker- 
controlled node. Headquarters in this scheme, Chen, Perrig, and song [7] put forward a q-composite 
random key pre-alpha-ever scheme, increase safe key settings, the attacker must more compromise nodes 
to achieve a high possible possibilities communication. The difference between the composite programs 
and solutions [6] requirements, this scheme at least asked (q : 1), not just a single one common keys, two 
sensor node, establish a shared key. These ask keys are the hash into a key and achieve better elasticity 
sensor node capture. The quantity that you need to share the keys index is difficult; the attacker to 
consider the key links given already damaged part of the key. 
Improve security of two random schemes key space [9, 12] have been proposed. An applicable key 
pre-distribution for sharing mechanism is to establish sensor network. Liu Sun Li puts forward [10] gather 
rather similar double key scheme based on the key distribution scheme [12]. In these two kinds of 
schemes, much key space precompiled and each sensor associated with one or more key space before 
deployment. Two sensor nodes can be calculated a double key deployed if they have keying information 
from an ordinary key space. In the two solutions, the communication between non-begin sensor node keep 
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a safe compromise of sensor nodes quantity less than a critical value. But once the critical value is too big, 
the opponent will collapse all double key. To have good scalability, a use knowledge base key 
management presents [13]. In this deployment point, the proposed multiple definitions each sensor 
network deployment point, a key space pre-computed. Neighboring deployment points a number key in 
common. All of the sensor node before classification deployment, each group corresponds a deployment 
point. Each sensor randomly selected from core several keys space group. Sensor nodes deployed, after 
closing has a high probability of neighborhood sharing a common key. The scheme has a strong demand, 
but deployment has good expansibility and those proposals [7] [8] [9] [10]. Overall structure to establish 
the two key in wireless sensor networks is studied in [14], is based in baled polynomial-key pre-alpha-
ever agreement [12] proposes. 
3. The proposed scheme 
In this section, we present our proposed double key establish plan in detail. In the most crucial pre-
distribution scheme, communication between pair wise key sensor node key memory cards used is not 
directly [6, 7], or can be from secret pre-loaded stock [9, 10, 11, 12]. Then once sensor nodes are captured 
and opponent might crack other sensor nodes and even whole network through compromise keys or secret 
stocks. According to this problem, the program all keys hash value key pool formation a new key pool. 
What we call the key is in key hash value derivative key be caused by. Because one-way hash function the 
nature, anyone can easily derived from the original keys, but nobody calculated from the original keys. 
3.1 Key Predistribuion 
This phase is done offline mainly by key distributed server (KDS) before deploying sensor node to the 
target area. It is the following steps: 
Step 1: KDS produce very big scale of key pool, and identify different keys. KDS assigns each key an 
unique ID. 
Step 2: KDS hash value calculates the key use the same pool hash function H and store it in these 
cheap key pools. here, we use these hash value derivative key be caused by. Now the key pool has two 
seconds keys, an half the original keys and derivative keys. 
Step 3:  For each sensor node, KDS storage hash function H, it used to create derivative key into each 
sensor node. 
Step 4: For each sensor node, KDS random selection of key from the core pool S and store them into 
each sensor node. Here, we call it a set of t key nodes keys. In this scheme, we think derivative k the same 
key id and original key k. 
3.2 Shared Key Discovery Phase 
 After sensor nodes have been deployed, shared key discovery phase will be implemented. In this phase, 
the sensor for the first time that key nodes is discovery. Their neighbors share a key. Detect whether a 
node there is a common characteristic ID front have its neighbors and source node disclosure of the key 
documents and type of list these keys destination node. Hypothesis sensor u and sensor v. Neighbors 
gained the key list and the type of intrusion detection systems (IDs). If they decided they have common 
features identifier. They can be calculated pair wise key. As follows: 
Example 1: Below this kind of circumstance, common keys are used as their double key. That is if they 
are original key, double. The key is that the original key ko , if they are derived the key is caused by the 
derivative key adversary. 
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Example 2:  The key sensors are you a completely original key, the key sensor v derivatives of the key. 
In this case, the double key is derivative Kd and sensor I need calculation opposite be caused by calculate 
H (ko).
3.3 Path Key Establishment 
The critical path used to assign establishment stage however sensor node to a nearby key, do not share 
common keys, being connected two or more links to create. The key findings in the Shared phase. Des can 
get new double key from this message. If direct key establish sensor network node failed, the two can try 
to establish an adversary key critical path establishment stage. When a source sensor radio ID of sensor, a 
destination Intermediate sensor may formulate a path of key two ff can pair wise source sensor nodes and 
with the sensor destination, respectively. Otherwise, intermediate sensor broadcast message constantly 
until find share sensor pair wise keys with previous sensor and destination sensor etc. The path of key can 
build along the message broadcast path in the reverse direction. 
4. Performance analysis 
In this section, we evaluate the network security property proposed method and make suggestions and 
then compare the proposed scheme with several existing key pre-distribution scheme. 
4.1 Establish Direct Key 
Now we calculate the local connection computer, the probability the sensor two adjacent establish 
communication double key directly. Similar to the analysis in [6], the two nodes probability have the 
same key id. This is sensor node two probability to establish direct key. 
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Fig. 1 Probability of establishing direct keys between neighbor sensor nodes for different S
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Figure 1 shows the probability to establish direct key different number of key preload, each sensor. 
From this find we can see with the same key S and pool size. Key ring lengths are not local connected to 
the scheme. 
4.2 Resilience against sensor capture 
Node capture attacks the most serious threats wireless sensor networks, an adversary may body be 
trapped Sensor node secret information storage compromise, after have one Wireless sensor nodes are not 
compressive due to its low cost. Random key pre-alpha-ever plan [6, 7], the same key can be sensor 
network different photoes, some sensor capture may affect communication and other non-captured node. 
Here, the tough measurement schemes by forecasting short total network communication, so the 
occupation X node does not include communication compromise of nodes are directly involved. In this 
section, we studied the scheme of elastic of sensor capture through the probability analysis. 
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Fig. 2 Fraction of compromised link between non-compromised nodes, after an adversary has compromised x random nodes 
Figure 2 includes a fraction of the relationship between them the damaged links, non-begin nodes and 
number of compromise node. We could see more the sensor compromise, higher scores links, non-begin 
to compromise. 
4.3 Comparision with other scheme 
Assess our work, in this section we compare previous work plan. Safety mainly comparison in here, 
this is non-begin a fraction of influence. Here, we chose Eschenauer-Gligor scheme [6], q-composite Plan 
(q=2, 3) [7], [8] because DDHV scheme compared with our plan. 
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Fig. 3 Fraction of compromised link between non-compromised nodes, after an adversary has compromised x random nodes. 
Figure of links between comparative compromise scores non-begin sensor obtain the same place 
connected PL, T and storage overhead. We can see that our plan obviously better than the other three 
schemes. For example, Give PL = 0.33, there are 500 sensor nodes is damaged, There will be a 63 percent 
of the link. Non-compromised between compromise Sensors in such as solution, in q-composite 84% (q = 
2), in q-composite 96% (q = 3), it is only 50% in our plan. Although when DDHV proposal execution pair 
wise key than our plans are established. Some sensor network node, the opponent will control 
compromise the entire network once number of compromise sensors node than threshold. 
5. Conclusion 
We presents a pair wise key  management plan wireless sensor networks, some damaged sensor node 
only affect the sensor node uncompromising part and one-way hash function, this scheme can make the 
attacker get less critical information from the damaged sensor node. We have conducted a study of 
connectedness. The results show that the proposed scheme is considerable elastic reason for the 
opposition Sensor nodes are caught. 
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